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COMIMENTS

THE MTA, IT'S NOT "GOING YOUR WAY-LIABILITY OF THE METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY UNDER
FELA: GREENE v. LONG ISLAND R.R.
JEFFREY J. AMATOI

INTRODUCTION

Since the invention of the steam engine, railroads have
played a key role in the development of industrial and passenger
transportation. In the nineteenth century, owners of railroads
amassed great fortunes, while the services they provided helped
to create a great industrial network and a means for the wealthy
to travel from coast to coast.' This service came at a cost to the
men who worked for the railroads; they suffered grotesque
injuries 2 and endured harsh living conditions. 3 In the twentieth
t J.D. Candidate, June 2002, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., summa
cum laude, St. John's University.
1 See Sam Hall Kaplan, The Vanderbilt Homes, Los ANGELES TIMES, August
27, 1989 at 36H ("During America's Gilded Age, which lasted from about 1860 to
1927, no family was more gilded than the Vanderbilts. Having accumulated their
wealth from railroads, shipping and land in the heady days before income,
inheritance and property taxes-and antitrust laws ... ."). See generally SUSAN
DANLY & LEO MARX, THE RAILROAD IN AMERICAN ART: REPRESENTATIONS OF

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, (MIT Press 1988); FRANK NORRIS, THE OCTOPUS; A
STORY OF CALIFORNIA, (Doubleday & Co. 1901).
2 See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring);
see generally FRANK HAMILTON SPEARMAN, THE STRATEGY OF GREAT RAILROADS

(Charles Scribner's Sons 1904).
3 See Frank N. Wilner, Labor Relation: How CSXT Is Leaving Past Practices
Behind, RAILWAY AGE, Nov. 1998, at 72 ("Train crews were required to utilize
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century, railroads fell into a state of disarray; financial disaster
and abandonment led to governmental control over most of the
nation's railways. 4 Today, because of their ability to transport a
great number of passengers and large amounts of freight, with
minimal impact to the environment, railroads are again being
developed as a viable mode of transportation. 5 State and
municipal
governments
have
created
transportation
"authorities" that coordinate all aspects of mass transportation. 6
These authorities are charged with achieving the goal of making
railroading more efficient, cost effective, and appealing to both
commuters and industry.
Recently, in Greene v. Long Island Railroad,7 a federal
district court ruled the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(MTA) was liable under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA)8 to its employees who are involved in interstate railway
operations. 9 The decision involved a suit brought by an MTA
police officer injured while patrolling near a Long Island
Railroad (LIRR) train station. This decision, if allowed to stand,
holds the MTA, a non profit public benefit corporation that
facilitates the coordination of mass transportation in the New
York Metropolitan Area, liable to some of its employees under

plastic bags to deposit human waste because locomotives weren't equipped with
sanitation facilities.").
4 See Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 792 F.2d 287, 295

(2d Cir. 1986) (noting that federal regulations like the Final System Plan, which
was drafted by the United States Railway Association pursuant to statute,
attempted to resolve a crisis in railroad transportation through a restructuring of
the industry).
5 See U.S. Transportation Secretary Announces Railroad Rehabilitation and
Improvement Financing Program, M2 PRESSWIRE, May 20, 1999 (describing the

Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing Program as an effort to
promote economic development and environmentally sound solutions for railroads,
particularly government sponsored authorities and corporations).
6 See
Metropolitan
Transportation
Authority, MTA
Network, at
http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us (last visited Oct. 11, 2000); Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority, MTBA Mission Statement, at http://www.mbta.com (last
visited Oct. 11, 2000); Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, A
Message from the GM, at http://www.septa.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2000); Chicago
Transit Authority, CTA Overview, at http://www.transitchicago.com (last visited
Oct. 11, 2000); Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, History of Public
Transportation in Greater Cleveland, at http://www.gcrta.org (last visited Oct. 11,
2000).
7 99 F. Supp. 2d 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
8 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
9 See Greene, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 274-75.
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the FELA, even though the MTA does not "operate as a common
carrier" within the meaning of the FELA statutory scheme.
On March 4, 1998, Sean Greene (Greene), a MTA police
officer, was involved in an automobile accident while on patrol
with his partner near the LIRR Ronkonkoma train station.'0
The police officers were responding to a reported auto theft at
that station." Greene was formerly a member of the LIRR police
force. Beginning in 1997, however, the MTA established its own
police force, which assumed the duties of the LIRR police.
Officers of the former LIRR police were appointed as MTA police
officers in 1998.12
Greene brought an action under the FELA against the MTA
and LIRR, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The
MTA argued it was not liable under the FELA because it is not a
common carrier within the meaning of the statute, and the LIRR
argued it was not the plaintiff's employer.' 3 The district court
denied defendants' motions, but granted permission to seek an
interlocutory appeal, 14 "noting that no case.., is directly on
point, and it appears none exists." 5
The court "reluctantly" held that the MTA operates as a
common carrier and may be held liable under the FELA.16 "The
court's reluctance comes not from any sense that the common
carrier question is close. It arises, instead, from the court's
conviction that FELA's liability standard regarding railroad
workers injured on the job is one that has become outmoded." 7
The court focused on the MTA's "extensive involvement" in its
subsidiary LIRR, and relied on cases where injured plaintiffs
were either employees of railroads, or involved in railroading
activities, and sought compensation from a non-railroad parent
is
company.
10 See id. at 270. Greene was riding with his partner, in an unmarked patrol
Jeep owned by the MTA when it collided with another car. See id.
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 See id. at 271.
14 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994). An order otherwise not appealable may be certified
to for interlocutory appeal while the action is stayed provided the issue is a
controlling issue, and for which there is substantial ground for difference. See id.
15 Greene, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 274 ("This precise issue has not heretofore been
decided and existing precedent is, accordingly, not helpful.").
16 See id. at 270.
17

Id.

18 See id. at 274.
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This Comment analyzes whether the MTA operates as a
common carrier and critiques the court's application of the FELA
to the MTA. It is submitted that Greene was decided incorrectly
under the prevailing interpretation of the FELA. This Comment
asserts that the court overlooked the broad picture of what the
MTA actually does, failed to recognize the Supreme Court's
interpretation of "operate" in the context of parent company
supervision, and disregarded common law opinions holding that
the MTA is not a common carrier. Additionally, the court
disregarded the overwhelming policy considerations that compel
avoiding an unwarranted expansion of an archaic system of
compensation. Part I of this comment discusses the FELA, its
history, requirements, and application. Part II describes the
MTA, its history, purpose, function, and structure. Part III
analyzes how the FELA does not apply to the MTA. Part IV
considers the deficiencies of a fault-based workers compensation
system like the FELA.
I.

THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ACT

The FELA created a federal cause of action imposing
liability on "common carriers by railroad" engaging in interstate
commerce.1 9 The Act was a predecessor to modern no-fault state
compensation systems, and was then seen as a progressive
measure aimed at an unusually hazardous job.20 "Cognizant of
the physical dangers of railroading that resulted in the death or
19 45 U.S.C. § 51. Section 51 provides in pertinent part:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaged in commerce between
any of the several States or Territories... shall be liable in damages to
any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce... for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from
the negligence of any officer, agents, or employees of such carrier ....
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee
shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall in any
way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above
set forth shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be considered as being
employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as
entitled to the benefits of this chapter.
Id.
20

See James A. Squires, Regulating Safety Culture in the Railroad Industry:

The Time Has Come for Broader Horizons, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 93, 106 (2000) (noting

that the FELA was intended to provide compensation to workers injured in the
unusually hazardous railroad industry, but improvements in railroad safety
standards have resulted in employee casualty rates that are comparable with other
transportation and non-transportation industries).
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maiming of thousands of workers every year, Congress crafted a
federal remedy that shifted part of the 'human overhead' of doing
business from employees to their employers." 2 1 "The Federal
Employers' Liability Act was designed to put on the railroad
industry some of the cost for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which
Congressional action was
it consumed in its operations."2 2
necessary because of courts' tendency to favor railroad owners,
who erected barriers to plaintiffs' claims with common law
defenses such as the fellow servant rule, assumption of risk, and
contributory negligence. 23 These common law defenses were
swept away with the enactment of the FELA in 1908.24 In order
to further the congressional policy of aiding railroad workers, the
Supreme Court has construed the FELA liberally, by applying
relaxed standards of negligence, and extending liability for nonaccidental injuries such as disease and emotional distress. 25 The
FELA, however, does not make the railroad a virtual insurer of
26
its employees.
21 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994) (quoting Tiller v.
Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 59 (1943)).
22 Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring); see
also H.R. REP. No. 60-1386, at 1 (1908).
23 See Wilkerson, 336 U.S. at 67 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]he employer was
often effectively insulated from liability even though it was responsible for
maintenance of unsafe conditions of work."); see also Tiller, 318 U.S. at 59 (noting
that prior to the FELA, the assumption of risk doctrine was applied in most railroad
injury cases, based on the notion that railroad employees accepted the additional
risks of the job in exchange for the additional compensation that railroad jobs
provided, and that these employees were free to resign at any time); Toledo, St.
Louis & W. R.R. Co. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165, 168-69 (1928) (indicating employees
assumed the risk of grave injury when working for a railroad company).
24 See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 53, 55. Additionally, because of continued court bias,
illustrated by jury verdicts favorable to employees being overturned by courts, a
1939 amendment, 45 U.S.C. § 54, removed assumption of risk as a valid defense
under the FELA. See generally N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ambrose, 280 U.S. 486, 491
(1929) (noting that a railroad employer was not liable for the death of an employee
who was killed by inhaling poisonous gasses used to kill insects in grain cars,
because the employer had warned the employee of the dangers of the fumes, and
therefore, the employee must have assumed the risk of entering the car where such
fumes were present); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U.S.
472, 474 (1926) (noting that through the FELA, Congress preempted state laws and
made railroad employers liable to their employees).
25 See Consol. Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 549-50 (holding a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress is cognizable under the FELA); Rogers v. Missouri
Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (articulating a relaxed standard of applicable
negligence); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180-87 (1949) (rejecting the argument
that the FELA applies only to injuries caused by accidents).
26 See Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 653 (1947) ("The Act [FELA]
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Liability under the FELA is limited to interstate "common
carriers by railroad." 27 "Common carrier" is defined by the FELA
as including "the receiver or receivers or other persons or
corporations charged with the duty of the management and
operation of the business of a common carrier. "28 Supreme Court
jurisprudence has defined the phrase as "one who operates a
railroad as a means of carrying for the public ....29
The distinctive characteristic of a common carrier is that it
undertakes to carry for the public indifferently, offering service
to the public generally. 30 Common carrier status does not apply
to companies that are not railroads open to the public.31 Thus,
the FELA does not extend to: carriers by water,3 2 express
companies, 33 freight
forwarders, 34 industrial
companies
does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his employees while they are
on duty.").
27 45 U.S.C. § 51; see also S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 212 (1917) (noting
that Congress limited the liability of railroad employers under the FELA to those
employers who were common carriers and engaged in some activity having "a direct
and substantial connection with railroad operations"); Garrett v. S. R.R. Co., 278
F.2d 424, 425 (6th Cir. 1960) (concurring with the court below that the defendant
railroad was not a common carrier, and therefore not liable to its employees under
the FELA because "it was not performing the non-delegable duties of a railroad; it
was not the operator of a terminal; and it performed no switching or transportation
functions at all").
28 45 U.S.C. § 57.
29 Edwards v. Pac. Express Fruit Co., 390 U.S. 538, 540 (1968) (holding that
based on legislative history, consistent judicial decisions, and the administration of
the FELA, refrigerator car companies are not "common carriers by railroad" within
the meaning of the Act) (citations omitted).
3o See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175, 187 (1920) (defining a common
carrier by railroad as "one who operates a railroad as a means of carrying for the
public..."); Mahfood v. Cont'l. Grain Co., 718 F.2d 779, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1983)
(granting defendants' motion for summary judgement on the basis that it was not a
common carrier by railroad under the FELA); Kelly v. Gen. Elec. Co., 110 F. Supp.
4, 6 (E.D. Pa. 1953), affd, 204 F.2d 692 (3d. Cir. 1953) (stating that a "common
carrier has been defined as one who holds himself out to the public as engaged in
the business of transportation of persons or property from place to place for
compensation, offering his services to the public generally").
31 See Edwards, 390 U.S. at 540 (stating that a common carrier is one who
operates a railroad as a means of carrying for the public).
32 See S. Pac. Co., 244 U.S. at 212-13 (stating that the FELA is applicable
"where parties are engaging in something having a direct and substantial
connection with railroad operations, and not with another kind of carriage separate
and distinct from transportation on land...").
33 See Wells Fargo & Co., 254 U.S. at 188 (stating that the original Interstate
Commerce Act was construed as including carriers operating railroads, but not
express companies).
34See Latsko v. Nat'l Carloading Corp., 192 F.2d 905, 909 (6th Cir. 1951)
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maintaining railroad facilities for their own use, 35 companies
37
36
or sleeping car companies.
leasing refrigerator cars,
Accordingly, common carrier status should not extend to public
benefit corporations whose purpose is to coordinate an efficient
management of all aspects of mass transportation.
to
Lone Star Steel Co. v. McGee38 articulated a four-part test
39
determine whether an entity has "common carrier" status: (1)
the actual performance of rail service; (2) the service being
performed must be part of the total rail service contracted for by
a member of the public; (3) the entity must be "performing as
part of a system of interstate rail transportation by virtue of
common ownership between itself and a railroad or by
contractual relationship with a railroad... [;]"40 (4) the railroad
receives some form of remuneration for the services performed,
"such as a fixed charge from a railroad or by a percent of the

(finding that freight forwarders are not common carriers and therefore not covered
by the FELA).
35 See Mahfood, 718 F.2d at 781-82 (finding that performance of some railroad
functions did not qualify the defendant as a common carrier under the FELA when
not performed for the public); Duffy v. Armco Steel Corp., 225 F. Supp. 737, 738
(W.D. Pa. 1964) (finding that although a company owned and operated railroad
equipment, it was not a common carrier under the FELA because it had not been
used to transport the goods of others or offered for public use); Tilson v. Ford Motor
Co., 130 F. Supp. 676, 678 (E.D. Mich. 1955) (finding that a company is not a
common carrier where the railroad operated was confined to the company's
manufacturing area and not offered to the public generally); Malvern Gravel Co. v.
Mitchell, 385 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Ark. 1964) (stating that a company owning one
switch engine, but neither tracks nor railway cars, was not operating as a common
carrier within the meaning of the FELA).
36 See Edwards v. Pac. Express Fruit Co., 390 U.S. 538, 540 (1968) (finding that
FELA's references to "operating a railroad" and a "going railroad" would indicate
that the business of renting refrigerator cars to railroads or shippers and providers
did not qualify as a "common carrier by railroad").
37 See Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio. R.R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94 (1915) (stating
that an employee of a sleeping car company providing services to a railroad was not
an employee of the railroad within the meaning of FELA); Taylor v. New York C.
R.R. Co., 294 N.Y. 397, 404 (1945) (citing Robinson in holding that Congress failed
to include those persons on interstate trains and engaged in services for other
masters among those for whom the railroad companies were to be liable under
FELA).
38 380 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1967). Lone Star Steel operated an intra-plant rail
system, but did not restrict the use of the railroad to its company alone; rather, it
transported for others and charged them fees, and received dividends from the
service. See id. at 646.
39 See id. at 647.
40 See id.
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profits from a railroad."4 1 The test is not exclusive, but provides
42
only a list of various considerations of prime importance. Most
importantly, "FELA jurisprudence gleans guidance from
common-law principles," upon which courts should rely in
addition to the enumerated factors. 43 Interpretation of the FELA
begins with the statute itself, its purposes, and the construction
given to it over the years.
A parent company that does not appear to be a railroad may
be subject to the FELA under certain circumstances, "Where one
railroad company actually controls another and operates both as
a single system, the dominant company will be liable for the
injuries due to the negligence of the subsidiary company." 44 A
non-railroad parent company must completely dominate the
railroad subsidiary, not only with respect to stock ownership, but
also management and operations. 45 Additionally, a plaintiffemployee of the parent non-railroad, as in Greene, must be both
assigned to railroad work, and injured as a result of negligence
in the operation of a railroad which the parent completely

See id.
See id.; see also Kieronski v. Wyandotte Terminal R.R. Co., 806 F.2d 107, 108
(6th Cir. 1987) (indicating that the four part test in Lone Star Steel is not limited,
but only a guidance).
43 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1994) (noting that the
Court must consider the common law treatment of rights asserted under FELA).
44 Davis v. Alexander, 269 U.S. 114, 117 (1925) (finding that the dominant
corporation should be regarded as the principal, and "constituent" companies as
agents, when the dominant corporation derives profits and losses from traffic
originated on any of the constituents' lines); accord Lehigh Valley R.R Co. v.
Dupont, 128 F. 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1904) (stating that "the dominant corporation be
regarded as the principal and the constituent corporations as agents when ... the
dominant corporation ultimately derives all the profits and incurs all the losses
arising from the traffic originating on any of its lines"); see also S. Ry. Co. v. Crosby,
201 F.2d 878, 883 (4th Cir. 1953) ("Where one railroad company actually controls
another and operates both as a single system, the dominant company will be liable
for the injuries due to the negligence of the subsidiary company." (quoting Davis,
269 U.S. at 117)); Erie R.R. Co. v. Krysienski, 238 F. 142, 145 (2d Cir. 1916)
(examining factors in determining whether a dominant carrier has sufficient control
over a subordinate carrier to warrant an extension of liability); Wichita Falls &
Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 157 P. 112, 126 (Okla. 1915) (noting that an
engineer, employed by two related companies and injured through the negligence of
one or both companies while doing the work of both, may sue one or both
companies).
45 See Eddings v. Collins Pine Co., 140 F. Supp. 622, 628 (N.D. Cal. 1956)
(finding that one company controlled another so completely that there was "in fact
one railroad system").
41

42
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controlled.46 Therefore, in determining the liability of a parent
company under the FELA, the central issue is one of control over
actual operation of the interstate railroad.47 Although this
theory of liability has grown out of traditional tort liability of
agency,48 the Supreme Court has consistently held that a
implying that actual
master-servant relationship is necessary,
49
control is prerequisite for liability.

II. THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
The MTA was created in 1968 in response to the
deterioration of the railroads in the New York Metropolitan
Area. 50 Created as a public authority of the State of New York,
"a body corporate and politic constituting a public benefit
corporation," 51 its purpose was to set the policies and budgets of
transportation agencies in New York City and seven suburban
counties. 52 The MTA is governed by a board of directors that are
collectively appointed by the Governor, the Mayor of New York
City, and the Chief Executive of each of the counties into which
the MTA's authority extends. 53 Common directors serve on both
46 S. Ry. Co., 201 F.2d at 882.
47 See Eddings, 140 F. Supp. at 629 ("It simply places responsibility under the
Act upon the party performing the railroad functions covered by the Act.").
48 See Kelley v. S. Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 323 (1974) (holding that a finding of
agency is not tantamount to a finding of a master servant relationship).
49 See id; see also Baker v. Texas & Pac. R.R. Co., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959)
(stating that the "familiar general legal problems" as to whose employee or servant
a worker is at a given time is a matter of federal law under the FELA); Hull v.
Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 252 U.S. 475, 479 (1920) (noting that Congress
used the words "employee" and "employed" in their natural sense); Robinson v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 92 (1915) (distinguishing between an
employee of a railroad company and one who is "on the train simply in the character
of a servant of another master by whom he was hired, directed and paid, and at
whose will he was to be continued in service or discharged").
50 The Long Island Railroad was financially ruined as of 1965, causing the
State of New York to assume operations. See generally JOHN FINK, THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY 984 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1995).
51 N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1263(1)(a) (McKinney 1999). See also PETER
DERRICK, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY 758 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed.,
1995); 87 NY JUR. 2D PublicAuthorities § 1 (1999).
52 See DERRICK, supra note 51. Agencies that the MTA oversees include: the
Long Island Rail Road; Metro-North Commuter Railroad; New York City Transit
Authority; the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority; the Metropolitan
Suburban Bus Authority; and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority. See id.
53 See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1263(1); see also Rose v. Long Island R.R.
Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 916 (2d Cir. 1987) (describing the makeup of the MTA
and its purposes).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.75:113

the MTA and the LIRR board of directors. 54 The chairman of the
MTA establishes committees to monitor and review the various
agencies operating under the MTA, including the LIRR. 55 The
purpose in creating the MTA was to unify and assure that
railroads around New York City would be stabilized,
strengthened, and improved through the flexible and efficient
management of services.5 6 In order to fulfill its purpose, the
MTA was granted broad managerial powers to "do all things
necessary, convenient or desirable to manage, control and direct
the maintenance and operation of transportation facilities,
equipment or real property operated by or under contract, lease
57
or other arrangement."
The various agencies the MTA manages are categorized as
either subsidiary or component units.58 The LIRR and the
Metro-North Commuter Railroad, agencies covered under the
FELA, are considered subsidiary units, while other agencies that
are not covered under the FELA are considered component
units. 59 This difference is significant because subsidiary units
are considered to be independent and distinct operational
agencies. 60 But the MTA plays an active role in coordinating the
54 See Greene v. Long Island R.R. Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 268, 272-74 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (detailing the purpose, structure, and function of the MTA).
55 See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. Law § 1263(4)(b) (McKinney 1999).
56 See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1264; see also NY JUR. 2D Rail Transportation§
85 (1999) (describing the MTA).
57 N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §1266(1)-(8). Other specific powers given to the MTA
include: the power to acquire, establish, and maintain facilities; establish and
collect fares and tolls; establish standards of operation regarding safety; and lease
railroad cars. See id.; see also Greene, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (discussing the broad
powers given to the MTA to meet its purposes to develop and improve commuter
transportation).
58 See Greene, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (stating that the MTA is comprised of
"subsidiary units" and "component units").
59 See id. (noting that the MTA Excess Loss Trust Fund, MTA headquarters,
along with the LIRR and Metro North commuter rails are "subsidiary units," but
that the New York City Transit Authority, the Manhattan and Bronx Surface
Transit Operating Authority, the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority,
the Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority, and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel
Authority are "component units" of the MTA).
60 See id. ("MTA apparently attaches significance to denominating its
commuter rails as subsidiary units, rather than component units... refer[ring] to
the component units as 'operationally and legally independent' of MTA
headquarters while making no such similar distinction with respect to commuter

rails."); see also 2 RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1896 (2d

ed. 1998) (defining "subsidiary company" as "a company whose controlling interest
is owned by another company").
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budgets, marketing, and operating policies of all its agencies. 6 1
Railroads that are covered by the FELA occupy only one
part of the vast MTA organization. For example, railroads
covered by the FELA employ approximately 11,000 of the 64,000
people employed by the MTA as a whole. 62 Likewise, on the
average weekday, more than five million passengers and 781,000
motor vehicles use MTA facilities. 63 Of these, only 491,000
64
passengers are LIRR and Metro-North riders.
In 1997 the MTA was authorized to create a uniformed
police force to patrol the MTA's trains and facilities. 65 Initial
appointments to the newly created police force were the
members of the old LIRR and Metro-North Railroad police
forces. 66 The merger of the two police forces was touted to be
beneficial to the commuters' needs. 67 Practically, the merger
expanded the jurisdiction of the former police forces to include
the
"metropolitan
commuter
transportation
district,"
encompassing the city of New York and the seven suburban

61 See Greene, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 273-74.
62 See id. at 273 (indicating, however, that these numbers were compiled prior
to the MTA's creation of the MTA police force); see also Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, MTA TransportationNetwork, at http:/www.lirr.org/mta/network.htm
(last visited Jan. 4, 2001) (indicating that the MTA employed 57,551 people in 1998,
including 6,096 with the LIRR and 5,443 with Metro-North, totaling 11,539 in
commuter rails).
63 See id. (indicating that on the average weekday in 1998, the MTA collected
5,721,834 paid rides, including 269,331 paid rides on the LIRR, 222,580 on MetroNorth, 754,821 toll paying vehicles at MTA bridges and tunnels). Interestingly,
New York City Transit, which includes New York City busses and subways,
collected 5,146,677 on the average weekday in 1998. See id.
64 See John Fink, Railroads, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY 984
(Kenneth T. Jackson, ed., Yale Univ. Press 1995) ('"The LIRR, the largest commuter
line in the nation, carried about 263,000 passengers a day in 1991, [and] MetroNorth about 200,000."); Metropolitan Transportation Authority, MTATransportationNetwork, at http://www.lirr.org/mta/network.htm (last visited Jan.
4, 2001) (indicating that the number of weekday commuters carried by the LIRR
and Metro-North combined was 491,911 in 1998).
65 See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1266-h(1) (McKinney 1999) ("The authority is
hereby authorized and empowered, to provide and maintain an authority police
department and a uniformed authority police force.").
66 See id. § 1266-h(2) ("Initial appointments to [the MTA] police force shall be
all incumbent police officers from the Long Island Rail Road Company and/or MetroNorth Commuter Railroad Company at the time of such appointment.").
67 See Metropolitan Transit Association-Police Force Creation, 1997 N.Y.
Laws 2319, 2320 ('"Iis legislation... will enhance the level of police service offered
to MTA commuters. The consolidation will provide for greater coordination and
efficiency in the provision of services to all of the MTA region.").
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counties serviced by the MTA.68 The merger empowered MTA
police officers to patrol far more territory than before the merger.
Recognizing that the new police force employees would not be
subject to the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974,69 which provides
retirement compensation for employees of railways operating in
interstate transportation, 70 the New York State legislature
authorized the MTA to provide a twenty-year retirement plan for
71
its employees.
Currently, the MTA plays a minimal role in the operation of
the LIRR and Metro-North. Section 1277 of New York's Public
Authorities Law permits the MTA to transfer the "operational
costs" of local railroad stations to municipal or county
governments. 72 In Heimbach v. Metropolitan Transportation
Authority,73 the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the MTA
68N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1262, 1266-h(1) (indicating in Section 1266-h (1)
that the MTA police force would have jurisdiction in the metropolitan commuter
transportation district, that Section 1262 defines to include "the city of New York
and the counties of Dutchess, Nassau, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Suffolk, and
Westchester. . ").

69 See 45 U.S.C. § 231 (1994) (providing retirement and disability annuities for
individuals who have a "current connection with the railroad industry").
70 See 49 U.S.C. §10501(a)(2)(A) (outlining annuity eligibility requirements).
71 See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1266-h(4) (providing the MTA with the power to
create a twenty-year retirement plan for its employees and detailing small
differences between the MTA retirement plan and the retirement and social security
law); Metropolitan Transit Association-Police Force Creation, 1997 N.Y. Laws
2319, 2320 (indicating that a twenty-year retirement plan was a provision
negotiated for by the unions of the LIRR and Metro-North); see also, N.Y. RETIRE. &
SOC. SEC. LAW § 389 (McKinney 1999) (detailing the twenty-year retirement plan
for LIRR police officers, from which the MTA police retirement plan was copied).
72 Under New York's Public Authorities Law, the transfer of such costs is
permitted:
The total cost to the authority and each of its subsidiary corporations of
operation, maintenance and use of each passenger station within the
district serviced by one or more railroad facilities... shall be borne by the
city of New York if such station is located in such city or, if not located in
such city, by such county within the district in which such station is
located.
N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1277. see also Heimbach v. MTA, 553 N.E.2d 242 (N.Y.
1990). In Heimbach, the court stressed that "total cost" within Section 1277 was
limited by the words "of operation, maintenance and use" and should not include
tort claims, in the interests of municipal fiscal planning and tax payer equity. See
id. at 244; see also 89 NY JUR 2D Rail Transportation§ 54 (1999) ("The operation,
maintenance, and use of passenger stations are public purposes... and the costs to
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and its subsidiary corporations in that
regard are borne by the city if the station is there located and otherwise by the
county of its location.").
73 553 N.E 2d 242 (N.Y. 1990).
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could not pass the costs of tort liability on to a county or
municipality as "operational costs."7 4 The court noted that
operational costs include the costs of cleaning, snow removal,
and maintenance, but not the costs of actually operating the
railroad itself.7 5 Additionally, the MTA has been described as a
"regional transportation agency" which has a subsidiary unit
that performs "rail carrier" service.7 6 The MTA acts as a
coordinator, acquiring and leasing property, in order to provide
the most efficient and cost effective management of financial
operations. 77 This, in turn, entitles the MTA to federal subsidies
and subjects it to regulation by agencies like the Interstate
Commerce Commission,78 but not, it is submitted, the FELA.
III. APPLICATION OF THE FELA TO THE MTA
The FELA sets out essentially a two-part test for liability.
First, the employer must be a "common carrier by railroad while
engaging in commerce between any of the several states.. ...79
Second, the injured employee must be "employed by such carrier
in such commerce.... ,"80In deciding the first prong of the test,
the court should consider each element separately: first deciding
whether the MTA is a "railroad" under the FELA; if so, whether
the MTA is a "common carrier;" and finally, whether the MTA is
"engaged in interstate commerce" under the Act.8 '
74 See Heimbach, 553 N.E.2d at 246. In Heimbach, the MTA sought to pass on
to Orange County the cost of a $369,722 settlement given to a commuter who
slipped and fell on ice at the Goshen station. See id. at 243.
75 See id. at 244.
76 See Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 792 F.2d 287,
293-94 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the ICC had the power to fix reasonable rates
for services and track rights that the MTA could charge to Amtrak as the MTA was
a "regional transportation agency" under the RPSA (Rail Passenger Service Act)).
77 See Metropolitan Transportation Authority, MTA Homepage: Capital
Program2000-2004, at http://www.lirr.orglmta/cap2000-2004.htm (last visited Jan.
29, 2001) (describing the MTA's efforts to provide the most efficient management
and cost effective operations); Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Progress
Report to Investors 2000, at http://wvww.lirr.org/mta/investor.htm (last visited Jan.
29, 2001) (discussing the MTA's plans to become a leader in cost effective
management of financial operations).
78 See Metro. Transp. Auth., 792 F.2d at 293 (finding the MTA's argument that
§ 402(a) of the RPSA does not apply to it untenable).
79 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
8o See id.
81 See id; cf Pickney v. Oro Dam Constructors, 441 F.2d 806, 808 (9th Cir.
1971) (applying a similar test for determining whether an employee's injury subjects
the employer to liability under FELA, requiring- (1) the employee be employed by a
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The initial inquiry involves determining the MTA's status as
a "railroad." Since the earliest days of the Act, it has been well
settled that street railway companies did not come within the
purview of FELA liability.8 2 The MTA is structured in a way
that makes its street railways "component units" and its
ordinary railroads "subsidiary units."8 3 The MTA is comparable
to other transportation conglomerates like the Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), which is also
composed of intrastate and interstate railroads.8 4
Unlike
SEPTA, however, the MTA does not claim to operate its
interstate railroads, but coordinates their operation as "wholly

common carrier by railroad; (2) the common carrier by railroad be engaged in
interstate commerce; and (3) such employee's duties shall be in furtherance of
interstate or foreign commerce, or shall somehow "directly or closely and
substantially affect such commerce").
82 See Omaha v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 230 U.S. 324, 325 (1912)
(holding that "the word 'railroad' as used in the constitutions and statutes of the
various states does not include street railway companies"); McKenna v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 670 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 1986), afl'd, 829 F.2d 186 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (identifying a long-recognized exception within FELA for "street
railways"); see also Washington Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Scala, 244 U.S. 630, 637-38
(1917) (stating that ordinary railroads, as opposed to street railways, come within
FELA); Mangum Capital Traction Co., 39 F.2d 286, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (stating
that street railways are not included within the classification of "common carriers
by railroad" as used in the FELA).
83 Greene v. Long Island R.R., 99 F. Supp. 2d 268, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting
that the commuter railways of the LIRR and Metro-North are among the MTA's
subsidiary units, but that the New York City Transit Authority is a component
unit).
8 See Felton v. S.E. Pa Transp. Auth., 952 F.2d 59, 61 (1992) (holding that
FELA liability should only extend to those workers who are involved in interstate
operations of the Authority). The Long Island Railroad is subject to the FELA
because in addition to commuter service from Long Island to Penn Station in New
York City, it carries freight and has lines that connect to interstate transportation.
See Long Island R.R. Co. v. Intl Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 709 F.
Supp. 376, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting the LIRR carries freight in interstate
commerce); see also Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 230 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1913).
[Olrdinary railroads are constructed on the companies' own property. The
tracks extend from town to town and are usually connected with other
railroads, which themselves are further connected with other railroads,
which themselves are further connected with others, so that freight may be
shipped, without breaking bulk, across the continent. Such railroads are
channels of interstate commerce. Street Railroads, on the other hand, are
local, are laid in streets as aids to street traffic, and for the use of a single
community ....
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owned subsidiary unit[sl."8 5 Additionally, the MTA police serve
all units of the MTA, including street railways not subject to the
FELA and commuter railroads that are liable under the Act.86 A
holding that applies FELA liability to MTA employees who are
engaged in interstate operations of the subsidiary unit commuter
rails8 7 is inappropriate because the MTA police have concurrent
jurisdiction with that of local police authorities and patrol
commuter rail areas, as well as other transportation agencies
such as Long Island Bus and New York City Transit.8 8 For
example, an MTA police officer patrolling New York City's
Jamaica LIRR station is confronted with the reality of policing
the LIRR, New York City busses, subways, and, if need be, the
streets adjoining the station.8 9 Furthermore, calling the MTA a
railroad and allowing MTA police a cause of action under the
FELA, while local and municipal police concurrently serve
within the same jurisdictions,9 0 countermines the Congressional
intention for the FELA to apply to those "who were peculiarly
exposed to injuries because of the nature of their occupation, i.e.,
the hazardous business of railroading." 91 Allowing employees of
the coordinating authorities of railroads to be covered by the
85 Greene, 99 F. Supp. 2d 268, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
86 See N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 2 (McKinney 1999) (defining street railroads as "a

railroad... for public use in the conveyance of persons or property for
compensation, being mainly upon, along, above or below any highway, including all
equipment, switches, spurs, tracks, right of trackage, subways, tunnels, [and]
stations... "). The MTA's enabling statute gives local police authorities concurrent
jurisdiction to serve the same areas and functions as officers of the MTA. See N.Y.
PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1266 (8) (McKinney Supp. 2001) ("Each municipality or political
subdivision ...in which any facilities of the authority.., are located shall provide
for such facilities police, fire and health protection services of the same character
and to the same extent as those provided for residents of such municipality or...
subdivision.").
87 See Greene, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
88 See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1262, 1266-h(1). Long Island Bus maintains a
bus depot at the specific Ronkonkoma train station where plaintiff was on patrol.
Additionally, MTA police stationed in Penn Station are faced with patrolling a
station that contains Long Island Rail Road, New York City Transit and other MTA
agencies. See Green, 99 F. Supp. 2d. at 273 (discussing the MTA component units
that provide transportation services); see also MTA Long Island Railroad, LIRR
Ronkonkama Timetable, at http://www.mta.nyc.ny.ushlirr/html/ttn-/ronkonko.htm
(visited Jan. 27, 2001) (displaying the LIRR schedule at the Ronkonkoma station
and discussing transfers at Penn Station).
89 Interview with Scott Robinson, MTA police officer (Jan. 5, 2001).
90See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW 99 1262, 1266-h(1).
91 Reed v. Pa. R.R. Co., 351 U.S. 502, 510 (1956) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting)
(arguing clerical workers should not be covered by FELA).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.75:113

FELA would be an extension of the statute, and another step in
92
the court's "lexicographical" reading of the 1908 Act.
Assuming the MTA can be considered a railroad under the
terms of the Act, the next inquiry would be whether the MTA is
a common carrier. The inquiry made in Lone Star Steel Co. v.
McGee93 focused on "actual performance of rail service."94 The
MTA, however, "coordinates the planning and overall policies of
its agencies, approves operating and capital budgets and
performance plans, and monitors financial and operating
activities of its agencies... [and] is responsible for certain cross
agency support functions." 95 The MTA police are accordingly one
of these "support functions." The police do not operate the LIRR,
nor do they play a substantial or intricate role in its operation or
96
management.
Crucial to the determination of common carrier status is the
definition of "operate" under the FELA. 97 The district court
settled for the plain definition of "operate" as to mean "to
perform a function."9 8 The court did not take into consideration,

92 Id. at 508-09. In 1956, the court construed the 1939 amendment to the FELA
that eliminated the assumption of risk defense as extending coverage to clerical
workers because they "furthered interstate commerce." This was considered not only
"lexicographical," but also a "door opening" decision that was unlimited in scope and
ignorant of legal consequences. See id. Similarly, analogous decisions allowing a
court to interpret "operate" as merely performing a function would have similar door
opening consequences and could permit an unwarranted increase in litigation.
93 380 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1967).
94 Id. at 647.
95 Greene v. Long Island R.R., 99 F. Supp. 2d 268, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
96 See Strykowski v. Northeast Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Co., 827 F. Supp. 468,
469-72 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (dismissing commuter railroad police officer's FELA claims
due to insufficiency of evidence concerning "activities that are scarcely even
arguably connected in a tangential way with" the requirements of the FELA), rev'd,
30 F.3d 136 (1994) (reversing and remanding for further inquiry into 11th
Amendment immunity and a more in-depth analysis of FELA subject matter
jurisdiction).
97 See 45 U.S.C. § 57 (1994). Imposes liability to those entities not directly
covered by FELA but who are "charged with the duty of the management and
operation of the business of a common carrier." Id.
98 Greene, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (relying on the definition of "operate" given in
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 984 (5th ed. 1979), and THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 931 (rev. ed. 1982) meaning "to perform a
function"). Conversely, "[wihile the MTA concede[d] certain management
responsibilities, it denie[d] any responsibilities that [could] be described as
'operating' [the LIRR's] facilities." See id. The MTA argued that "operate" should be
interpreted narrowly to include only the actual operation of trains, a function the
MTA left to its subsidiaries. See id.
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however, the definition the Supreme Court provided in another
federal liability act, regarding a parent corporation's liability for
its subsidiary.99 In United States v. Bestfoods,10 0 the Court
construed the term "operate" under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), in the context of a parent and subsidiary company,
holding that a parent corporation may be held liable for
"operating [a] facility" of a subsidiary under CERCLA where the
parent actually "directs the workings of, manages, or conducts
the affairs of [the] facility."10 1 The Court further explained that
certain activities of the parent that "involve the facility but
which are consistent with the parent's investor status, such as
monitoring of the subsidiary's performance, supervision of the
subsidiary's finance and capital budget decisions, and
articulation of general policies and procedures, should not give
rise to direct liability" for the parent. 0 2 The MTA's functions
correspond precisely with this notion of management and
oversight by a parent company, as the MTA monitors budget
decisions and promulgates policies and procedures. 10 3
In

99 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1998). In Bestfoods, the
Court addressed whether a parent corporation was liable for the costs of cleaning up
industrial waste produced by its subsidiary. See id. at 55. The Court ruled that "a
parent corporation that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the
operations of a subsidiary," could not be held liable "without more" as an "operator"
of the subsidiary's polluting facility, but that "a corporate parent that actively
participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of the facility itself may
be held directly liable in its own right as an operator of the [polluting] facility." See
id.
100 Id.

101 See id. at 66 (providing a narrow definition of "operate," noting that "for
purposes of CERCLA's concern with environmental contamination, an operator
must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution... ").
102 Id. at 72 (quoting Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator
Analysis under CEROLA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 223, 282 (1994)). The district court in
Greene, however, relied on the Supreme Court's definition of "common carrier"
under the Federal Hours Service Act 45 U.S.C. §§ 61-64 (1986) (repealed 1994). In
United States v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 249 U.S. 296 (1919), the court
held that a terminal, the agent of ten interstate railroads, was a "common carrier"
under the Federal Hours Service Act, because its acts were those "of a kind
ordinarily performed by a common carrier." Id. at 304-05. This definition is
distinguishable, however, because unlike the FELA, the Federal Hours Service Act
applied to water ferries as well as interstate railroads. Furthermore, Brooklyn
Terminal included ten interstate railroads whereas the MTA is only affiliated with
two. See id.
103 See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §1266(1)-(8) (McKinney 1999) (giving the MTA
broad managerial powers to "do all things ... necessary, convenient or desirable to

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.75:113

contrast, the LIRR, as a subsidiary, performs the "operations" of
the commuter railroad. 10 4 Therefore, the MTA's activities fall
within the "accepted norms of parental oversight of a
subsidiary's facility," which is more than sufficient to insulate
the MTA from liability under the FELA. 1 5
The district court also disregarded common law decisions
10 6
involving the MTA as being "neither binding nor persuasive."
The Supreme Court, however, has instructed courts to look to
common law principles when interpreting FELA issues where
there is no binding precedent. 0 7 The second circuit courts have
ignored these instructions by disregarding the common law
requirements of certain actions brought under the FELA. 0 8 One

manage, control and direct the maintenance and operation of transportation
facilities, equipment or real property operated by or under contract, lease or other
arrangement"). Other specific powers given to the MTA include: the power to
acquire, establish and maintain facilities; establish and collect fares and tolls;
establish standards of operation regarding safety; and lease railroad cars. See id.;
see also Greene, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
104 See Dellaverson Supp. Aff.
9. The functions of the subsidiary railways, the
LIRR and Metro-North, include operating railroad equipment; maintaining the
quality and cleanliness of equipment; scheduling commuter rail service; managing
rail operations through separate executive, line and staff personnel; setting fares;
and preparing budgets. See id.
105 See Bestfoods, 524 U.S, at 72 (noting that the critical question in
determining whether a parent company is liable for its subsidiary under CERCLA,
is whether, "in degree and detail," the actions of the parent or its agent have
exceeded the normal practices a parent company's oversight functions).
106 See Greene, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (indicating that because the cases did not
directly address the question of whether the MTA was a common carrier, they were
unpersuasive).
107 See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 544 (1994) (allowing an
employee to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress under FELA, after
first examining FELA, its purposes, "and the construction we have given it over the
years," and then considering "the common law's treatment of the right to recovery
asserted"). The Court in Gotshall went on to state, "[A]lthough common law
principles are not necessarily dispositive of questions arising under FELA, unless
they are expressly rejected in the text of the statute, they are entitled to great
weight in our analysis." Id.; see also Atchison, Topeka. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell,
480 U.S. 557, 568 (1987) (pointing out that "FELA jurisprudence gleans guidance
from common law developments..." in deciding whether an employee could bring a
FELA claim for emotional injuries); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949)
(agreeing with the Missouri Supreme Court that "negligence" should be defined in
accordance with federal common law principles since it was not defined within the
FELA); Morant v. Long Island R.R., 66 F.3d 518, 522 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting the
appropriateness of using common law principles, including that of negligence per se,
inapplying the FELA).
108 See Eric London, Buckley v. Metro North Commuter Railroad: Expansion of
Employer Liability Under FELA, 8 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL. ISSUES 297, 297 (1997)
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decision that was disregarded was Noonan v. Long Island
Railroad,10 9 where a New York State Supreme Court ruled the
MTA was not liable for the negligence of its subsidiary, the
LIRR." 0 Furthermore, the court discussed the parent subsidiary
relationship between the two companies stating, "[T]he MTA's
subsidiary corporations are distinct entities .... [E]ach
subsidiary is responsible for the maintenance and repair of its
own facilities, and the functions of the MTA do not include the
operation, maintenance and control of any facility.""'
Additionally, the district court did not consider decisions of
the National Mediation Board or the Railroad Retirement Board
as persuasive or binding. 2
When the Teamsters Union
attempted to represent clerical workers in the MTA's Madison
Avenue offices, the National Mediation Board was called upon to
consider whether the MTA was a common carrier under the

(criticizing the second circuit for expanding railroad liability under FELA in
asbestos related emotional distress actions).
109 551 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1st Dep't 1990) (finding that plaintiff who tripped while
crossing tracks and property of LIRR could not hold MTA liable for "the torts
committed by a subsidiary arising out of the operations of the subsidiary
corporation").
110 See id. at 233; see also Thaxton v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 520 S.E.2d 735,
739 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing the issue of whether a parent holding company
is a common carrier, and thus liable under FELA, and ruling that the parent
company must dominate the operations of the subsidiary to be held liable); Montez
v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 350 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (1st Dep't 1974) (holding the MTA is
not liable for the actions of its subsidiary, the LIRR).
111 Noonan, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 233 (1st Dep't 1990); see also Cusick v. Lutheran
Med. Ctr., 481 N.Y.S.2d 122, 123 (2d Dep't 1984) (holding that a widow of a bus
driver could not recover from the MTA because its functions with respect to public
transportation are limited to financing and planning, rather than operation,
maintenance or control of any facility).
112 See generally Greene v. Long Island R.R. Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 268 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (lacking any reference to the National Mediation Board or the Railroad
Retirement Board). Courts, however, are required to defer to administrative
agencies with the authority and expertise to administer regulations. See Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(noting that where a statute is ambiguous and an administration has previously
interpreted the statute, "the court does not simply impose its own construction on
the statute," but considers "whether the agency's [interpretation] is based on a
permissible construction of the statue"); Wassenberg v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd.,
75 F.3d 294, 296 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that in reviewing an agency's interpretation
of a statute, the court should give the agency "deference" if there is a "reasonable
basis" for the interpretation); Intl Ass'n of Machinists v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 930
F.2d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that the scope of review of NMB "decisions...
'is one of the narrowest known to the law' " (quoting Intl Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Trans World Airlines, 839 F.2d 809, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1988))).
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Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). 113 The mediation board reviewed
many of the same factors examined by the district court in
Greene.114 While admitting the LIRR was a carrier under the
RLA, the Board determined the MTA was not. "[The] MTA is a
public body created by a state to run a mass transportation
network which incidentally includes several carriers subject to
the Board's jurisdiction."1 5 Similarly, neither the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1974,116 nor the Railroad Unemployment
Insurance Act 1 7 covers employees of the MTA. 118 Concluding
that the MTA is a common carrier under the FELA is inapposite
in light of its status under these federal regulations imposed on
railroads that rely on similar definitions of "carrier."119
IV. DISADVANTAGES OF FAULT-BASED COMPENSATION SYSTEMS

When first enacted, the FELA represented a milestone in
workers compensation and tort reform. 20
It soon became
anachronistic
due to the implementation of workers
compensation laws nationwide. 121 It now is described as
"archaic," "unwarranted," and outmoded. 122 The district court
should have shown greater deference to these considerations in
its application of the FELA to the MTA. 123 The costs of fault
113 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1994); see also Intl Bd. of Teamsters, 8 N.M.B.
1 (1980).
114 See id. at 3 (noting that the NMB findings of fact included that the "MTA is
a public benefit corporation... [serving] over seven million passengers ... and

600,000 vehicles").
115

Id.

at 4. "In terms of passengers served, number of employees, and allocation

of financial resources, the railroad operations are dwarfed by the non-railroad
operations. Management of LIRR... on a day-to-day basis is independent of direct

control by the MTA." Id. at 5.
45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231v (1986).
45 U.S.C. §§ 351-368 (1986).
118 See Weiss Decl. Ex. E.
116
117

119 Cf N.J. Transit Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n Local 304 v. New Jersey
Transit Corp., 806 F.2d 451, 454 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting Congress' unique treatment
of the railroad workplace, citing the four regulatory Acts as examples, in the context
of determining the Fair Labor Standards Act exemption).
120 See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality In The Economic Analysis Of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 391 (1994); see generally James A.
Squires, Regulating Safety Culture in the Railroad Industry: The Time Has Come
for Broader Horizons, 27 TRANSP. L. J. 93 (2000).
121 See TRANSP. RES. BD., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, Compensating Injured Railroad
Workers Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 52-53 (1994).
122 Greene v. Long Island R. R. Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 268, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
123 See Denis J. Brion, The Chaotic Indeterminacy of Tort Law, in RADICAL
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based compensation systems have been proven, 124 and they have
125
failed to promote safety in the railroad industry.
Furthermore, some scholars link the demise of the railroads to
FELA liability.126 Unfortunately, the statute remains, due in
127
part to intense lobbying by railroad unions and trial lawyers.
Fault based compensation systems for workplace injuries
were abandoned early in the twentieth century as they
precipitated unfavorable results for both employers and
employees. 128 Employers loathed the potentially catastrophic
losses that could result, while workers disliked their slim odds of
receiving any compensation. 129 Additionally, the fault system
was biased against large railroads, as awards against large
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THEORY AND PRACTICE, 199 (David S. Caudill & Steven Jay Gould eds., 1995)
("[Tihe judicial opinion is an opportunity for the court to reach, and rationalize,
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carriers were far greater than those against small carriers. 130
Thus, the abolition of the FELA has been called for almost since
its inception.' 31 No-fault systems are superior in that they
emphasize rehabilitation and uniformity of payments, require no
proof of negligence, and limit recovery strictly to economic
32
damages.
The most compelling policy argument against FELA liability
is the statute's impact on safety and profitability of railroads.
Deregulation has been viewed as the primary cause of the
railroad's return to profitability after years of operating at a
financial deficit. 133 The FELA is seen as the nemesis of
35
railroads, 134 and a huge roadblock in the way of profitability.
Most notably, the FELA has a tremendous adverse effect on the
railroad safety by discouraging productive communications
regarding accident causes, and thereby directly reducing
preventative measures.

36

Though there have been several

suggestions on how to improve or modernize the FELA, none
130 See Watson, supra note 124, at 8B.
131 See Squires, supra note 120, at 107; see also DON DEWEES, DAVID DUFF, &
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1992, at 14 (noting deregulation triggered railroads return to profit).
134 See Railroad FELA Claims Costs Skyrocket 250% in 16 years, WORKERS'
COMP. EXECUTIVE, Apr. 9, 1997 (noting "FELA is both inefficient and subject to
serious abuse"); Railroad Injuries, Editorial, J. COMM., June 2, 1994, at 6A
("Century old labor laws that segregate railroads from the rest of American industry
make little sense today."). The FELA has been the subject of comical satire:
Franklin Roosevelt had a dog named Fala-and everywhere in the
world the President went, Fala was sure to follow. In an attempt to
discredit the President, Republicans spread a rumor that Fala and FDR
had become separated in a foreign city and a Navy vessel had been
dispatched, at great expense to taxpayers, to retrieve the pooch.
FDR had the last laugh, however, chiding Republicans for a politically
motivated attack on an innocent and defenseless dog.
While President Roosevelt had a dog named Fala, the railroads have a
dog named FELA-but there is nothing loyal or funny about FELA, which
stands for the Federal Employers' Liability Act. FELA is a dog in the
pejorative sense because it has created excessive mistrust between carriers
and their employees.
Wilner, supra note 128, at 12.
135 See Burke, supranote 133, at 14.
136 See Squiers, supra note 120, at 108 ("[Elach side skews the focus of the
investigation. This is due to the potential need to prove the other side's negligence,
not just on the facts of an accident, but on how its circumstances are reported and
how injuries are described.").
132
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have prevailed. 137 The fact remains that the FELA creates a
substantial impediment to the management, implementation,
and administration of general railroad safety programs.
In addition to these policy considerations, the court should
have looked to the realities of its decision. Allowing the FELA to
apply to all MTA employees increases the chance of litigation in
an area that is already overloaded. 138 A compromising decision
whereby the FELA would only apply to MTA police working on
railroads covered by the Act would produce unfair results. The
reality of policing in an urban area may lead to situations
requiring coordination between both FELA and non FELA
covered officers, or situations requiring covered officers to travel
outside their designated jurisdictions. These distinctions would
serve to produce unfair results and law enforcement inefficiency.
The practical and economic impacts on the MTA compel a
different decision. Ruling that the FELA is applicable to the
MTA creates a situation where the MTA is reduced to operate in
an inefficient manner by either accepting the higher costs of
FELA liability, or forcing a reversion to separate police forces for
each subsidiary of the MTA, as it was during the inefficient and
unproductive period before the merger of the forces in 1997.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Employers Liability Act, at one time a
breakthrough for oppressed railroad workers, is now a statute
that has outlived its usefulness and is perpetuated as a result of
the lobbying efforts of trial lawyers. The FELA threatens the
very existence of many railroads, even though railroad workers
could, today, be adequately covered under New York State's
workmen's compensation laws. The unwarranted extension of
FELA liability to the MTA perpetuated an unsound theory of
employer liability and evinced an inaccurate judicial perception
of the actual functions of the MTA. The MTA functions as a
coordinator, managing an integrated public transportation

137 See GAO Weighs FELA, No-Fault;Agency Finds Middle Ground, US RAIL
NEWS, Sept. 24, 1996 (reporting that Congress has considered repealing FELA and
the GAO recommended capping non-economic damages, limiting attorneys' fees
and/or permitting arbitration of claims).
138 See Joan T. A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Worker's Compensation
Systems: Is Federal Reform the Answer?, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1083, 1083-84
(1999).
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system, which incidentally includes two railroads subject to the
FELA. The MTA, itself, does not operate as a common carrier
under the meaning of the statute and therefore should not be
held liable under the FELA.

